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Abstract 
 
Purpose – The paper investigates governance in service triads, specifically studying significant 
steering and connecting coordination failures in order to reveal typically hidden characteristics 
and consequences.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – This study focuses on coordination functions and activities 
between a buyer (a government department), a customer (a military service) and two service 
providers. Rich data on these normally confidential service ties are drawn from an official 
report into the causes of a fatal accident involving a UK reconnaissance aircraft and specifically 
from the evidence presented regarding the earlier development of its complex safety case. We 
also analysed a range of additional secondary data sources.  
 
Findings – We examine the sources, drivers, and manifestation of coordination failures. We 
uncover a series of coordination failures driven from the bridge position, revealing that while 
bounded rationality and opportunism influenced steering coordination failures, connecting 
coordination failures were associated with knowledge asymmetry, dyadic inertia, and unethical 
practices. 
 
Practical implications – Organisations and governments delivering complex projects and KIP 
services should guard against outsourcing the ‘coordination’ activity to a third party, and 
thereby relinquishing the bridge position. Handing over the bridge position to an integrator 
would leave the client vulnerable to coordination dysfunctions such as bounded rationality, 
opportunism, knowledge asymmetry, dyadic inertia, and unethical practices. 
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Originality/value – The study links the previously separate research streams of service triads 
and coordination functions and activities. While extant research pays attention to mainly 
positive control functions, this study focuses on all three actors in two (failed) service triads— 
and highlights the impact of coordination activities and coordination failures. 
 
Keywords: Service triads, inter-organisational relationships, coordination, coordination 
failures; professional services; service operations; secondary data analysis 
 
Paper type - Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
Service supply chains are structurally, as well as managerially, distinct from physical supply 
chains (Giannakis, 2011; Sampson and Spring, 2012). In contrast to goods-focused supply 
chains, service supply chains are bi-directional in nature, as customers provide inputs into the 
productio  process (Sampson and Spring, 2012). In other words, service-providers cannot 
operate service processes until the customer inputs have been received (Lovelock, 1983; 
Sampson and Froehle, 2006). Thus, the performance of the service is contingent on governance 
and effective coordination of inputs from multiple actors in the bidirectional supply chain 
(Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014). 
Governance issues become even more complicated with the introduction of additional 
actors as the complexity of the inter-organisational relationship evolves from a dyadic to a 
triadic- or network level. Service triads typically consist of three actors involved in a service 
exchange. Unlike service supply chains, there are interdependencies between the three actors, 
which makes the attribution of risks, responsibilities, and performance difficult. A normative 
triad consists of a service provider, service buyer, and the service customer (Li and Choi, 2009). 
Another type of triad is the ‘buyer-supplier-supplier’ triad, where multiple suppliers are 
providing services to the buyer (Choi and Wu, 2009a; Wynstra et al., 2015).  
Prior governance studies investigating the management of inter-organisational 
relationships have begun to focus on how relationships are controlled and coordinated through 
formal (such as contracts) and informal (such as trust) governance mechanisms (Roehrich, 
Tyler, et al., 2020; Schepker et al., 2014; Zheng et al., 2008). Some scholars have also started 
to examine these specific challenges in service triads (van Iwaarden and van der Valk, 2013). 
While the concept of triadic control has received some more attention (for example, Li and 
Choi, 2009; van der Valk and van Iwaarden, 2011), prior studies offer limited insights 
regarding the concept of coordination (a notable exemption is Bastl et al., 2019), despite its 
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importance for driving performance (Oliveira and Lumineau, 2017). Consequently, our study 
focuses on coordination in service triads. Specifically, we investigate how such coordination 
fails. Following Gulati et al. (2012), we define inter-organisational coordination failures as the 
problems hindering the combination and integration of the organisation’s resources in a joint 
effort. While some scholars have examined a range of coordination failures such as a 
mismanaged crisis response (Moynihan, 2009), and profit decline due to newly implemented 
policy changes (Aggarwal et al., 2011), prior work offers very limited insights concerning the 
drivers and manifestation of coordination failures in service triads. Without examining the 
coordination failure in service triads, our understanding of governance in service triads will 
remain incomplete. Thus, this study addresses the following research question: How do 
coordination failures manifest in service triads? 
 We address this research question by investigating two service triads, consisting of a 
buyer (part of a government department), a customer (a military service) and two professional 
service providers. We follow the call by Bastl et al. (2019) to focus on all three actors in a 
service triad to better understand coordination, thus offering a more detailed investigation of 
the triad by not only focusing on a single actor (e.g., Li and Choi, 2009) or a single dyad (e.g., 
Karatzas et al., 2016) within a triad. The research draws on rich secondary data including an 
official report into the causes of the in-service loss of a UK aircraft and its crew, and in 
particular, on the evidence presented regarding the development of a complex safety case for 
this type of aircraft. The particulars of this ‘story’ offered a revelatory case study (Yin, 2018) 
of coordination failures in two service triads and highlighted some of the principal coordination 
challenges associated with buying complex services.  
This study develops two distinct, yet inter-related, contributions. First, extant studies 
on the governance of service triads have paid more attention to how the focal firm can control 
the interactions and activities within the triad (Li and Choi, 2009; van der Valk and van 
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Iwaarden, 2011). More recent studies have begun to examine both control and coordination in 
governing service triads (e.g. Bastl et al., 2019). We extend the work by Bastl et al. (2019) by 
focusing on coordination in service triads and examining steering and connecting coordination 
functions (Oliveira and Lumineau, 2017). Moreover, while Oliveira and Lumineau (2017) 
unpacked the coordination of inter-organisational networks by identifying steering and 
connecting function, and the activities associated with them, we extend their work by 
examining the failure of steering and connecting coordination functions across two service 
triads. Our findings support recent literature arguing that all three parties bear responsibility 
for coordinating a service triad (Bastl et al., 2019) while further suggesting that the party at the 
bridge position is a key source of coordination failures. Second, in contrast to prior studies 
which mainly focused on successful and high-performing service triads, we investigate 
coordination failures and their impact on service triads. We identify the causes of coordination 
failures and link them to steering and connecting coordination functions. By doing this, we 
provide an extension to our understanding of coordinating service triads. For example, Oliveira 
and Lumineau (2017) argue that a fit between the prevalence of steering or connecting 
coordination functions is essential for network performance. We extend this stream of literature 
by positing that buyer’s bounded rationality and service-provider’s opportunistic behaviour 
may lead to steering failure in service triads. Moreover, connecting failure in service triads is 
caused by knowledge asymmetry between the actors, dyadic inertia in the triad, and unethical 
practices. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section introduces the core 
notions of service triads, with a particular emphasis on coordination failures. Section 3 
discusses the methodological considerations and a description of the case context and findings 
are presented in section 4 and 5. Section 6 discusses the findings in light of the conceptual 
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background and conclude by formulating theoretical and practical implications as well as 
outlining future research avenues.   
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Service triads 
While inter-organisational relationships are predominantly analysed using a dyadic lens 
(Holma, 2012; Howard et al., 2019), most service exchange situations involve three (or more) 
actors. Therefore, the notion of triadic interaction offers scholars a mechanism to frame some 
key ‘beyond the dyad’ challenges. For instance, a buyer may have to choose between two 
competing suppliers (for example, Choi and Wu, 2009b, 2009c; Dubois and Fredriksson, 2008; 
Li et al., 2010; Wu and Choi, 2005) or a supplier may face two potential customers (Choi and 
Kim, 2008). Such instances are relativ ly more common in manufacturing contexts. Service 
triads, in contrast, typically involve interactions and relationships between three entities which 
are a buyer, supplier, and customer (Vedel et al., 2016; Wynstra et al., 2015). In this case, a 
service buyer contracts with a service provider to deliver services to a customer. The defining 
attribute of a service triad is that customer satisfaction depends upon the relationship between 
the customer and service buyer’s supplier (Bastl et al., 2019; Karatzas et al., 2016, 2017). 
Some service triads are responsible for delivering various knowledge-intensive 
professional (KIP) services. KIP services have long been procured in a very traditional fashion 
as instrumental services (Wynstra et al., 2006) but a large number of these arrangements 
involve direct and frequent interactions with the buyer’s customers (e.g. requirements capture 
and (contract) negotiations, analysis, innovation forums, prototype testing (cf: Spring and 
Araujo, 2009)). Given that such arrangements can extend over multiple years and/or projects, 
the service supplier effectively becomes ‘tied’ to the buyer’s customers. At the same time, KIP 
service triads that are being set up as complex services are often outsourced in order to 
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minimise expenditure, leverage economies of scale and scope (Davies et al., 2007) as well as 
potentially accessing new innovations and capabilities (Antonelli, 1998). KIP services 
represent a particularly vital area for further conceptual development. From the complex and 
contingent nature of the service processes (Lewis and Brown, 2012) to the idiosyncratic 
managerial control challenges (Harvey, 1990; Goodale et al., 2008) - research in this area has 
the potential to develop novel insights, understanding and theory enhancement (Harvey et al., 
2016). 
The interaction between the three actors in the (KIP) service triad could be constant or 
intermittent (Wynstra et al., 2015). Early literature on service triads has focused on exploring 
the structural dynamics. For example, Li and Choi (2009), adopting a social network 
perspective, posited that in the presence of a structural hole between two actors, the third actor 
bridging these two actors would receive information and control benefits (Burt, 1992). The role 
of bridging would usually be the domain of service buyer. Once the bridging occurs, and the 
two previously separated actors start connecting with each other, the state of ‘bridge decay’ is 
created. Furthermore, the service buyer may, willingly or unwillingly, relinquish its bridge 
position to the service provider, thus creating the state of ‘bridge transfer’. The buyer would 
then lose the information benefits that were afforded to him in the bridge position. In sum, the 
structure of triad has important implications for governance of intra-triad relationships, leading 
actors to maintain or relinquish their positions (Li and Choi, 2009).  
In addition to exploring the structural dynamics of service triads, prior studies have also 
explored how the interactions and relationships between the actors are managed. For example, 
due to inherent task interdependencies between the actors, cooperation between the three actors 
becomes critical for improving service quality and alignment of interests and capabilities 
(Finne and Holmström, 2013). Similarly, Andersson-Cederholm and Gyimóthy (2010) 
emphasised the dialectic tensions inherent in a service triad (i.e. loyalty and disloyalty, trust 
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and distrust), while Van der Valk and Van Iwaarden (2011) concluded that service triads could 
be properly governed by the right combination of (legal and social) contracts and monitoring 
activities. Other studies have explored the issues around actors’ roles and interpersonal 
interactions in service triads (Holma, 2012). 
More recent research has focused on control and coordination in service triads (Bastl et 
al., 2019; van Iwaarden and van der Valk, 2013). One of the key findings of this research stream 
has been to explore the roles of participating organisations in controlling and coordinating 
service triads. While some studies emphasised the role of the central actor (the bridge) or a key 
relationship in controlling service triads (Karatzas et al., 2016; Li and Choi, 2009; van der Valk 
and van Iwaarden, 2011), other studies have argued that all three actors are responsible for 
controlling and coordinating the triad (Bastl et al., 2019). Extant research on service triads has 
mainly focused on examining control in service triads (van Iwaarden and van der Valk, 2013; 
Li and Choi, 2009). In contrast, the concept of coordination in service triads remains under-
developed (Bastl et al., 2019); thus, by focusing on coordination in service triads, our study 
addresses the gap in this emerging stream of literature.  
 
2.2 Coordination failures in service triads  
In a service triad, the satisfaction of the customer with services depends on the interactions and 
relationship between the customer and the buyer’s supplier. Therefore, the buyer needs to 
coordinate the activities and interactions within the service triad. Coordination is defined as the 
alignment and integration of activities, processes, and roles to accomplish jointly determined 
goals (Gulati et al., 2012; Van de Ven et al., 1976). Understanding the drivers and barriers to 
coordination is critical because failures in coordination result in inefficiencies and delays, as 
well as eventual relationship breakdowns (Gulati et al., 2012). Moreover, task dependencies in 
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complex organisational arrangements such as service triads further emphasise the importance 
of coordination between the actors and their activities (Caldwell et al., 2017). 
In the past, mainly general and strategic management studies have conceptually and 
empirically explored the concept of coordination (e.g. Bechky, 2006; Gulati et al., 2012; 
Ranganathan et al., 2018; Van de Ven and Walker, 1984). Recently, the concept of 
coordination has been further dissected by uncovering functions - in particular steering and 
connecting - and their related activities which drive coordination (Oliveira and Lumineau, 
2017). The steering function includes activities such as: (i) goal setting; (ii) enforcing; and (iii) 
constraining-action. The goal-setting activities refer to the specification of requirements such 
as time, cost, and quality. Enforcing activities are formal and informal actions undertaken by 
the focal firm in ensuring the service conforms to the specifications. Finally, the constraining-
action activities refer to the mechanisms put in place to restrict the partner to deviate from 
standard operating procedures without submitting sufficient documentation and receiving 
approval. These activities are implemented through more structural mechanisms such as 
formally written contracts, hierarchical controls, and modularisation (Gulati et al., 2012; 
Oliveira and Lumineau, 2017; Tee et al., 2019) 
 In contrast, the connecting function of coordination includes activities such as: (i) 
monitoring; (ii) engaging; and (iii) liaising. The monitoring activities refer to actions taken by 
the focal firm to ensure the process and the output would meet its requirements. Such actions 
include regular checks regarding quality and work progress. Engaging activities include 
bringing organisations together to address any problems faced by the partners, joint problem 
solving, and arriving at a mutually agreed solution. Liaising activities refer to the actions taken 
by the focal firm to connect partners to other organisations and reconcile any divergences. 
Examples include getting approvals and licenses from local councils and working with 
organisations to identify and implement sustainability guidelines. These activities are 
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implemented through more relational mechanisms such as boundary-spanners, network 
orchestrators, and integrators (Gulati et al., 2012; Oliveira and Lumineau, 2017; Paquin and 
Howard-Grenville, 2013; Tee et al., 2019). 
 Although management scholars have traditionally emphasised the beneficial effects of 
closer relationships between partners, there is a recent shift in the literature towards exploring 
the dark side of inter-organisational relationships (Heirati et al., 2016; Moretti and Zirpoli, 
2016). For example, Villena et al. (2011) have identified an inverted curvilinear relationship 
between social capital and performance. Recently, Oliveira and Lumineau (2019) have also 
provided a useful overview of the antecedents, consequences, moderators, and manifestations 
of the dark side of inter-organisational relationships (such as conflicts, opportunism, and 
unethical practices). Our study continues this tradition by investigating a yet under-explored 
area of research. While it has been established that coordination failures lead to low 
performance, there is very little understanding of how these failures manifest in inter-
organisational relationships, and service triads in particular. Thus, this study explores 
coordination failures in service triads by investigating functions, namely steering and 
connecting, as well as associated activities.  
 
3. Research Method 
3.1 Research approach and sampling 
The objective of our research was to understand the manifestation of steering and connecting 
functions leading to coordination failures in service triads. Consistent with our objective of 
identifying explanation of a complex phenomenon in its natural context (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; Ketokivi and Choi, 2014), we adopted an in-depth case study approach. To 
fulfil this objective and address our research question, we had to sample on four criteria. First, 
we had to select a persuasive example of failure in service triads, along the lines of Siggelkow's 
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(2007: p20) “talking pig” (Lewis and Brown, 2012; MacCarthy et al., 2013). Second, we 
needed a context exhibiting both contracted and non-contracted relationships, which would 
enable us to examine the variance (or lack thereof) of steering and connecting functions, thus 
leading to coordination failures. Third, the actors should be independent entities to demonstrate 
clear structural linkages and the overall task needed to be complex and composed of 
interdependent activities to require coordination across them. Fourth, we were interested in a 
context where ‘pure’ services (Chase, 1978) are being exchanged in the triads. Knowledge 
intensive professional services raise some interesting challenges for coordination as they are 
inherently characterised by variable judgement, confidentiality, opaque quality, informal 
management, and organisational slack (Harvey et al., 2016; Lewis and Brown, 2012; Von 
Nordenflycht, 2010). 
In order to address the research question, we analysed the evolution of two service 
triads. The service providers were commissioned by a UK military ‘buyer’ to deliver a ‘safety 
case’ for a reconnaissance aircraft (i.e. a set of mandatory documents that identify, assess, and 
mitigate potentially catastrophic hazards before they cause an accident) for their customers 
(who operated the aircraft). Selecting a single case setting does not provide the confidence of 
a large n sample and inevitably raises concerns over generalisability, but two factors meant that 
this approach was deemed particularly appropriate for this study. First, accessing such 
commercially, technologically and militarily sensitive material would ordinarily be impossible 
but, tragically, on 2 September 2006, one of these aircrafts was lost, and its 14 crew killed 
while on a routine mission over Helmand Province in Southern Afghanistan. A public enquiry 
was held into the causes of the accident, and the report led by Haddon-Cave provides the basis 
for this analysis. The report covers a very broad range of issues, but it focuses in-depth [Part 
III, pp.163-340] on the specific service, involving two KIP service triads, to develop a safety 
case for the aircraft (Haddon-Cave, 2009). There was also significant ex-ante evidence of the 
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impact of knowledge asymmetries in the coordination and delivery of the services. For 
example, one supplier clearly leveraged their organisational reputation and more specifically, 
signalled to the customer (i.e. “opaque quality”: von Nordenflycht, 2010, p. 161) that they were 
getting a thorough job by delivering large reports. Indeed, the appointment of a second advisory 
firm (as a  independent advisor to the buyer) was intended to help overcome some of the worst 
of these knowledge asymmetries. 
In sum, our case selection and sampling logic followed Pettigrew’s (1990) suggestion 
to select polar types, and very few detailed cases are sufficient to investigate the cases in depth. 
The first triad (triad A) involved three actors: Royal Air Force (RAF, the service 
customer/operational client), The Ministry of Defense’s Integrated Project Team (IPT, the 
service buyer), and BAE Systems (the professional service provider). In this triad, RAF had 
contracted BAE Systems for the provision of aircrafts. Moreover, IPT was also contracted by 
RAF to handle the procurement and management of the service. Finally, IPT had contracted 
BAE Systems to produce a safety case for Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230. We, therefore, refer 
to this as the contracted triad. This kind of buyer-supplier-customer triad has been prominently 
studied in the service triad literature. 
The three actors in the second triad were: The IPT (service buyer), BAE Systems (the 
professional service provider), and QinetiQ (QQ, the professional service provider). This type 
of buyer-buyer-supplier service triad has received relatively limited attention in the service 
triads literature (Wu and Choi, 2005), even though their existence has been acknowledged by 
scholars (Wynstra et al., 2015). In this triad, IPT asked QQ to assume the role of an independent 
safety auditor to assess the safety case developed by BAE Systems. Of the three relationships 
in this triad, the only one with a formal contract was the IPT-BAE Systems relationship. Due 
to (relative) absence of formal contracts in this triad, we refer to it as the non-contracted triad. 
Examining this buyer-supplier-supplier triad, where two suppliers are delivering services to the 
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buyer, yet the performance of the service depends on their collaboration with each other, 
provides an interesting context to examine the manifestation of coordination failures in service 
triads (Choi and Wu, 2009b). 
In spite of being structurally different, there were two important characteristics 
common to both of them. First, both triads were examples of service failures. Second, both 
triads had the same party holding the bridge position (Li and Choi, 2009; Wynstra et al., 2015). 
Our sampling strategy allowed us access to an appropriate setting consistent with our 
objectives, while also allowing us to control for any intervening variables. 
 
3.2 Data sources  
‘Disasters’ that cause or are created by organisational failures are of increasing interest to 
OSCM researchers (e.g. Gupta et al., 2016; Labib et al., 2019). The emergence of the sub-field 
of supply chain risk, for example, has been directly influenced by the impact of events such as 
the 2008 economic crisis or the Japanese Tsunami or Mattel’s problems with lead paint (e.g. 
Chopra and Sodhi, 2014; Hora et al., 2011). Although a relatively new concern for OSCM, 
disasters and in particular man-made disasters such as the BP Deepwater Horizon, have long 
been of significant scholarly interest, in large part because they can lead to “alternative 
interpretations of events” (Gephart et al., 1990: p.30). Weick (1993), for example, used his 
analysis of the 1949 Mann Gulch fire to “re-examine our thinking about temporary systems, 
structuration, non-disclosure intimacy, intergroup dynamics, and team building” (p.628). 
Another aspect of such serious events is that they often result in official investigations that, in 
turn, generate extensive public domain reports that have been used as the basis for 
organisational research (e.g. Gephart, 1993; Turner, 1976). Brown (2000, 2004, 2005), for 
example, used official enquiry reports into the collapse of Barings Bank, the Piper Alpha oil 
rig disaster and the Beverly Allitt case to research institutional sense-making processes. The 
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use of secondary data sources has a long tradition in management research (e.g. Swan and 
Ettlie, 1997), but has only recently attracted more attention and calls in OSCM. For this study, 
we used the report: ‘The Nimrod Review: An independent review into the broader issues 
surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006’1 as our 
main data source. The report took nearly four years to complete at a cost of more than £400,000.  
Inevitably, this type of secondary data has limitations; not least the quasi-legal format 
of an official enquiry creates the potential for defensive and limited responses from key 
informants who are also potentially culpable. However, these concerns are outweighed by the 
advantages of secondary data research (Birkie et al., 2017; Stevenson and Cole, 2018). We 
draw on the richness and objectivity - achieved through the external verification process the 
data were subjected to during collection, analysis and presentation as data were collected and 
analysed by subject (i.e. military) experts - of secondary data sources for this research study. 
The official report, forming part of our dataset, was triangulated with a myriad of secondary 
data sources (please see Table 1 for a list of exemplary data sources). Triangulating additional 
data sources with the official report has further helped to gain insights concerning, for instance, 
both service triads, the organisations involved and their relationships. Moreover, additional 
data sources have helped to verify and check key findings, improving the study’s reliability 
and validity.  
 
 
1 The report is publicly available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229037/1025.
pdf (accessed on 12 February 2020) 
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Table 1: Exemplary additional data sources (sources accessed on 12 February 2020) 
Source 
 
Year Title  Link 









2006 Nimrod, Sept. 2006 https://humanfactors101.com/incidents/nimrod-sept-2006/ 
 

















2007 Board of Inquiry into the accident 











The Guardian 2009 QinetiQ chief resigns after firm criticized 
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Source 
 





2009 An independent review into the broader 
issues surrounding the loss of the RAF 
NIMROD MR2 Aircraft XV230 in 








2009 Safety cases and safety culture https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/139708.pdf 
 
BBC 2009 Cost cuts blamed for Nimrod crash http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8329117.stm 
 
Independent 2009 'Lamentable' failures led to Nimrod crash 




The Telegraph 2009 Nimrod crash review: report criticises 







2009 Air Force chief slammed in crash probe https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/local-news/airforce-
chief-slammed-in-crash-probe-933563 
 















2010 Aircraft History: The Nimrod MR.2 
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3.3 Data analysis 
In order to produce a contextually detailed account of the case study, the data were carefully 
analysed in a multi-stage process; supported by the qualitative data analysis tool, TAMS (Text 
Analysis Mark-up System) Analyzer (www.tamsys.sourceforge.net/) with broadly similar 
functionality to QSR NVivo (Weinstein, 2006). As an illustration of the initial analytical 
process the total report - comprising 317,481 words – was first coded based on the definitional 
models discussed earlier and then subsequently in a more open fashion based on the researchers 
reading of the data. The analysis then entered a more iterative stage involving the creation of a 
number of meta-code sets, analysis of co-coding and the addition/further refinement of codes; 
cycling back and forth between the primary and secondary data and the literature (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  
The software contributed to the process by producing word, code and co-code (i.e. text 
where more than one code was allocated) counts, permitting meta-code groups to be created, 
allowing for code searches against different text markers (e.g. ‘BAE’ versus ‘QinetiQ’ (QQ) 
responses) and producing software graphs summarising code patterns. Coding maps were used 
to support the process of creating meta-codes (i.e. via code aggregation and 
refinement/revision) and exploration of key interactions (i.e. overlapping codes/code sets and 
weak/strong co-coding).  
In the second cycle of coding, focused coding based on the literature was performed on the 
report and the secondary data (Saldana, 2015) to develop the data structure (provided in 
Appendix A) and to explore the linkages between the coordination functions (steering and 
connecting) and the drivers and manifestation of coordination failures (Oliveira and Lumineau, 
2017, 2019). Once the coding was completed, the authors held extensive discussions to resolve 
discrepancies regarding the interpretation of the phenomenon (Lawrence et al., 2016). 
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Secondary data (please see Table 1 for exemplary sources) were used for two purposes. 
First, they helped the researchers in familiarising themselves with the setting and state of the 
relationships before, at the time of, and after the disasters. Second, the data aided in 
corroborating evidence from primary data (Giudici et al., 2018).  
 
4. Within-case analysis 
4.1 Triad-A (RAF-IPT-BAE Systems) 
4.1.1 Steering function of coordination 
In triad A (please see Figure 1), the service buyer, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)’s ‘Integrated 
Project Team’ (IPT), was the focal node and bridge between the KIP service supplier (BAE 
Systems, part of the firm who designed and manufactured the aircraft) and the operational 
client (the Royal Air Force (RAF) who flew the aircraft). Although the separation between 
buyer and customer, in this case, is a structural organisational one (given that both are public 
sector organisations) there is nonetheless a clear division of roles, responsibilities, location, 
and staff. RAF had multiple contracts with BAE Systems for the provision of aircrafts. 
Moreover, IPT was also contracted by RAF to handle the procurement and management of the 
service. Finally, IPT had contracted BAE Systems to produce a safety case for Nimrod MR2 
Aircraft XV230. 
Figure 1: Contractual structure of the service triad 
 





Legend:  Presence of 
contract 
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Within the steering function of coordination, two activities were observed: goal setting and 
enforcing. From the RAF’s perspective, it was clear that airworthiness of the aircraft was the 
most important criteria. In contrast, IPT was under internal pressure to achieve a 20% cost 
reduction across the board, including procurement.  As noted by one of the IPT personnel: 
“Costs were King. All IPT Leaders were held to account very, very closely and to keep within 
resource totals. It was a heinous crime to go above” (Haddon-Cave, 2009: p325). Inevitably, 
IPT’s emphasis on cost control reflected in the contract negotiation with BAE, “‘[…] The 
previous Chief of Defence Procurement, Sir Robert Walmsley, told us in January 2002 that 
from the Nimrod case there were lessons to learn about accepting too readily a bid from 
industry (BAE Systems in this case) which was going to be too technically demanding to deliver 
within the cost and time offered.’. Additionally, the fixed price contract, the consequent cost 
pressure and financial losses was said to have provided little incentive for BAE Systems to 
deliver” (Haddon-Cave, 2009: p407). Negotiating a cost-focused contract reflects the bounded 
rationality of IPT’s managers, as they prioritised their goals of cost reduction over their client’s 
goal of quality. This is reflected in one of the key conclusions of the report, “George Baber 
failed to give adequate priority, care and personal attention to the preparation of the NSC. He 
failed properly to utilise the resources available to him within the Nimrod IPT to ensure the 
airworthiness of the Nimrod fleet. He failed to give the NSC the priority it deserved. In doing 
so, he failed, in truth, to make safety his first priority” (Haddon-Cave, 2009: p326). 
IPT’s goals of cost-reduction were enforced both internally (within the organisations) 
and externally (on its service-providers). First, all budget-reductions were made at the source, 
i.e., departmental budgets were reduced by 20% at the beginning of the financial year. The 
underlying assumption was that departments (and contractors) would come up with the ways 
to stay within the reduced budgets, failing which there would be a shortfall. Second, officers 
that delivered on the efficiency targets, irrespective of the adopted practices, were fast-tracked 































































ent: an International Journal 20 
to promotion. The enforcement of these goals was driven through a process-driven and 
hierarchical culture of the armed forces, as noted in the report: “The strong impression one 
gets from the witnesses and the evidence is that the 'strategic goal' of 20% and other required 
financial savings were implemented across the board with a ruthless, if not 'Stalinistic', 
efficiency.” (Haddon-Cave, 2009: p376). 
Enforcement of these goals led to the manifestation of opportunistic behaviour by BAE 
systems. For example, to meet IPT’s enforced goals while maintaining profit, BAE systems 
resorted to practices such as cutting corners, budgeting for inadequate man-hours (and yet using 
fewer than budgeted man-hours), and deploying more junior professionals to deliver the 
service: “When progress on Phase 2 fell behind, BAE Systems did not react appropriately: the 
IPT was not told and a suitable extension of the deadline was not sought; work became 
increasingly rushed and the quality of work suffered; corners were cut; inappropriate data was 
used to assess and sentence hazards; all the contractually required data was not used […] 
there was strong commercial motivation to finish the Nimrod Safety Case by the deadline at 
all costs (payment and prestige which BAE Systems hoped would lead to further similar work)” 
(Haddon-Cave, 2009: p264). The source of the time pressure was clear, with notes recording 
him saying: “[The IPT Lead] is ordering the sandwiches for the [completion] meeting 
already”, the project was “high profile” and “cannot afford to fail” (Haddon-Cave, 2009: 
p224). As a result, on 16 August 2004, a change of approach was adopted, described by the 
enquiry as “plainly cutting corners”, with the quality of analysis in certain areas deteriorating 
as time ran short. No evidence of constraining action was found in the triad, as RAF was not 
involved in the ongoing decisions. IPT, instead of asking for detailed informatio  from BAE 
Systems, created a culture where repeated questioning and confirming was discouraged. For 
example, in one instance when BAE Systems “asked for confirmation that he had understood 
correctly. This elicited a somewhat sarcastic response from Chris Lowe which confirmed he 
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had understood correctly but did not disguise his irritation at Witness K [BAE Systems]: 
‘...[your] continuous string of e-mails reminds me of a song called ‘…there’s a hole in my 
bucket…’’. This did little to improve relations between them.” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p221). 
 
4.1.2 Connecting function of coordination 
The prime role of MoD’ IPT was to act as an integrator for the project to coordinate the 
activities within the triad (Oliveira and Lumineau, 2017). In other words, IPT was acting as a 
bridge between RAF and BAE systems (please see Figure 2). IPT acted as the main client of 
BAE Systems, and both parties had regular interactions with each other. In contrast, BAE 
Systems and RAF had very little interaction with each other, and RAF had outsourced the 
project management to IPT.  
 
 
Figure 2: Relational structure of the service triad 








The connecting function of coordination performed by IPT was analysed in terms of three 
connecting activities: monitoring, engaging, and liaising (Oliveira and Lumineau, 2017). For 
instance, IPT did not monitor BAE’s activities and the output delivered. In fact, IPT’s lack of 
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attention towards monitoring is evidenced by the fact that it delegated this task to a civilian, 
Frank Walsh, who was reportedly inexperienced and incompetent to undertake this critical 
activity (The Independent, 2009). In addition to this, his assessment of the risks was hurried 
and c reless, and he did not seek guidance from his superiors when he was “clearly out of 
depth and did not know what he was doing” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p319). For example, he did 
not refer to his superiors the hazards left ‘open’ and ‘unclassified’ by BAE system. Moreover, 
towards the end, he also reduced the ranking of risks marked ‘remote’ to ‘improbable’. 
The lack of proper monitoring by IPT meant that opportunistic behaviour by BAE 
Systems went unnoticed. For instance, the IPT Safety Manager agreed that BAE Systems had 
completed phase 1 of the safety case, acknowledging receipt of a “populated but not mitigated” 
Hazard Log (p212). BAE Systems was paid and, under the assumption that the “scope of the 
task is clear”, asked to prepare a proposal for phase 2. Yet, a detailed reading of the six reports 
that accompanied the conclusion of phase 1 revealed that BAE Systems had left 40% of hazards 
open; all classed as having “a potential catastrophic outcome” (p246). Perhaps, as the enquiry 
report suggests, the sheer weight of the documents (a substantial “thud factor”; p290) was 
enough to assure the IPT that “a substantial, and indeed thorough, job had been done” 
(Haddon-Cove, 2009: p245). The knowledge asymmetry between IPT and BAE Systems also 
enabled deliberate obfuscation (Williamson, 1985). At an internal BAE Systems Meeting (17 
September 2003) for example, it was agreed that one member of the team would “draft some 
‘weasel’ words relating to completeness of data-bases” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p214). 
Similarly, on 10 November 2004 after the delivery of the 6 reports, BAE Systems gave another 
presentation which reinforced the (false) impression that they had completed the safety case 
task, stating that the Hazard Log was ‘fully populated’; and that all foreseeable hazards had 
been “identified and assessed, and addressed” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p246). 
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 In addition to the lack of adequate monitoring, data showed inadequate engagement 
from IPT and BAE Systems. It was found that IPT, driven by its cost and delivery pressures, 
ignored a number of recommendations by BAE Systems. For example, at the start of the 
project, BAE Systems recommended setting up of a Safety Case BAE Systems/Nimrod IPT 
working group “to partake in the identification determine causes and effects and mitigation of 
all hazards, and contribute toward the consequent population of the hazard log” (Haddon-
Cove, 2009: p274). However, no such working group was set up by either BAE Systems or 
IPT. Furthermore, BAE Systems’ advice pertaining to the fitting of fire-suppressing equipment 
following the reports of fuel leaks aboard RAF Nimrods was rejected by IPT (The Telegraph, 
2007).  
One of the IPT’s core tasks was to ensure BAE Systems’ work complied with RAF’s 
requirements, i.e., RAF was involved in key decisions and any divergences were promptly and 
jointly resolved— a task (i.e., liaising) in which IPT failed. IPT, for instance, did not set up a 
joint working group and failed to ensure RAF’s involvement: “Safety Cases lack any, or any 
sufficient, input from operators and maintainers who have the most knowledge and experience 
about the platform […] Operators at RAF Kinloss were not even aware of the existence of the 
original Nimrod Safety Case” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p535). Furthermore, IPT was responsible 
for setting up an independent, formal advisor, which it failed to appoint. It did engage QinetiQ 
(discussed in the next case), but the task was never formalised: “In my judgment, the Nimrod 
IPT failed properly to appoint an ‘Independent Safety Auditor’ (ISA) to audit the NSC, as 
required by Def-Stan 00-56 and JSP 553. The outcome might have been different if the IPT had 
ensured that an ISA had been properly appointed and tasked to carry out a full audit of the 
NSC” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p322). 
The lack of engagement and liaising (on the part of both IPT and BAE Systems) was 
driven by two factors: dyadic inertia and unethical practices on the part of both actors. First, it 
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was observed that BAE Systems sought to satisfy the buyer (IPT) rather than its operational 
client (RAF). It was initially envisaged that there would be ‘Operating Unit’ representation 
throughout the process, but actual ties to the customer were very limited. It has been noted how 
limited the Zonal inspection visits were, but the enquiry also revealed that whilst there was 
initially good attendance at review meetings by representatives from the operating bases (i.e., 
RAF), this waned from mid-2003 onwards. In sum, IPT remained the bridge between BAE 
Systems and RAF, and the bridge was not transferred to BAE Systems or RAF, as would be 
necessary for managing the triadic relationships. Another reason for this could be that the 
relationship between BAE Systems and IPT was found to be too informal, and the dynamic 
would have changed if RAF was involved in the relationship: “The bilateral relationship 
between BAE Systems and the Nimrod IPT […] with the former realising that it was unlikely 
to face much questioning of its work from the latter; the particular relationship between the 
key personnel at BAE Systems and the Nimrod IPT Safety Officer in charge of project managing 
the NSC task was altogether too cozy and informal” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p565).  
IPT’s failure to involve RAF in the relationship (or appoint a formal ISA, discussed in the 
next section) could be attributed to their unwillingness to lose control over the service. IPT 
rejected a number of safety recommendations by BAE Systems: “two years before the 
accident, the MoD did not act on a 2004 report by the manufacturer, BAE Systems, which 
recommended that a fire detection system be fitted in the bomb bay, where fuel leaks had 
occurred” (The Guardian, 2007). The involvement of RAF, who valued airworthiness over 
budgetary concerns, would have led to further investigation into these concerns. 
 
4.2 Triad-B (QQ-IPT-BAE Systems) 
4.2.1 Steering function of coordination 
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In triad B (please see Figure 3), the IPT asked another established KIP service supplier, QinetiQ 
(QQ), to take on the role of an “Independent Safety Auditor”. This buyer-supplier-supplier 
service triad (cf. Dubois and Fredriksson, 2008) had a more emergent structure (i.e. QQ was 
never formally tasked to be the “Independent Safety Auditor” but, rather over time, de facto 
assumed the role (Haddon-Cove, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 3: Contractual structure of the service triad 
 






As compared to Triad-A (BAE Systems-IPT- RAF), this triad had only one contract (between 
IPT and BAE Systems). As discussed previously, IPT enforced its goals of cost reduction on 
BAE Systems using fixed-price contracts. The goal of cost-reduction was prioritised over 
arguably more important goals of safety and airworthiness. Since there was no formal contract 
between IPT and QQ, IPT used the threat of taking the business away from QQ to coerce it to 
rubber-stamp the safety case prepared by BAE systems. By doing this, IPT enforced its goal 
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4.2.2 Connecting function of coordination 
Due to paucity of formal agreements governing this triad, the role of the integrator (IPT) 
became even more critical. IPT was supposed to act as a bridge between BAE Systems and 
QinetiQ (QQ) to ensure that the safety case prepared by BAE was assessed and signed off 
properly, a task in which it failed. There was very little, if at all, interaction between BAE and 
QQ, and the relationship between IPT and QQ was not collaborative (please see Figure 4). 
Both IPT and BAE saw QQ as an unnecessary bottleneck in their work. Moreover, both BAE 
and QQ saw each other as competitors in a task where collaboration and information-sharing 
was essential: “The triangular relationship between BAE Systems, the Nimrod IPT and 
QinetiQ: the former two clearly found the presence of the latter an unnecessary irritation 
and/or competition. As one contemporary observer said: ‘it was obvious to me that QinetiQ 
was not seen as a partner in ensuring the aircraft or crew safety’. The two commercial entities 
are wary of each other as they compete for the favors of the customer and future business, and 
jealously guard their own birthright.” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p565). 
 
Figure 4: Relational structure of the service triad 
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As an integrator, IPT had to perform three coordination activities: monitoring, engaging, and 
liaising (Oliveira and Lumineau, 2017). IPT was mainly concerned with ensuring that the 
safety case was delivered within budget and signed off at the earliest. Therefore, in addition to 
paying little attention to BAE’s quality of work, it hindered QQ’s monitoring of BAE’s work: 
“[…] he (i.e., QQ’s representative) initially refused to support the completion of the task by 
BAE Systems on the grounds that he was only standing in and had not seen any of the key 
deliverable documents, the other attendees booed me and muttered things along the lines 
‘bloody safety engineers always have to caveat their statements’” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p331). 
Due to this, BAE was able to get away with withholding the documents from QinetiQ. This 
withholding of information and lack of monitoring also hindered IPT’s engagement and liaising 
activities. 
Both IPT and BAE tried to minimise QQ’s involvement in the triad. As one of QQ’s 
representative reflected, “I felt that I was trespassing in a room where I really was not wanted” 
(Haddon-Cove, 2009). Furthermore, the phase-I of the safety case “had been produced without 
the appointment of an ISA, because the appointment of an ISA was a requirement of Def-Stan 
00-56 when Class A and B risks were involved” (Haddon-Cove, 2009). There was no evidence 
found for joint meetings and problem-solving. In fact, there was evidence that IPT effectively 
coerced QQ’s compliance when it tried to raise issues. For example, during one of the meetings, 
Martin Mahy (QQ) raised the need for ‘quantifiable targets’ for the preparation of case, “he 
received a somewhat hostile reception from the Nimrod IPTL, George Baber […] saying ‘I do 
not need to get independent safety advice from QinetiQ, I can go elsewhere’, referring to 
‘bloody QinetiQ’ and saying ‘QinetiQ is just touting for business’. […] Another member of the 
Nimrod IPT referred to the content of some of QinetiQ’s reports as ‘Tosh!’ […] After the 
meeting, Martyn Mahy spoke to Frank Walsh who said he was surprised at the “viciousness” 
of the IPTL’s comments about QinetiQ […]” (Haddon-Cave, 2009: p216).  
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Following this “carpeting” (p216), QQ’s priorities shifted. Anxious to maintain their 
relationship with the IPT, a meeting was arranged at QQ’s request to “clarify and defuse 
tensions”. One witness at the enquiry claimed that Project Managers went to “extraordinary 
lengths” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p217) and adopted a compromising stance to keep their client 
happy; including being prepared to modify their position: “QinetiQ was anxious to remain on 
good relations with the Nimrod IPT and not to lose business. Accordingly, at QinetiQ’s request, 
a meeting to ‘clarify and defuse tensions’ subsequently took place with the Nimrod IPT on 9 
March 2004. […] QinetiQ appear to have acknowledged what may have been seen as over-
zealous advice in the past by Witness L [QinetiQ] on a ‘tie-wraps’ issue but explained that he 
had left the company. […] The meeting seems to have been successful in smoothing things 
over” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p217).  
Finally, QQ ended up signing off on work that they had not actually seen. BAE Systems 
withheld the safety case from QQ throughout, and IPT did not make any effort to ensure that 
the case was made available to QQ: “It appears, however, that QinetiQ was not furnished with 
a copy of the Nimrod SMP. The reasons why not are not altogether clear. […] This is 
unfortunate because it was difficult to see how QinetiQ could properly perform its task (Task 
010) of advising the Nimrod IPT on its Safety Management System (SMS), including the NSC, 
without a copy of the Nimrod SMP. A copy was not provided by the Nimrod IPT to QinetiQ 
until November 2007…” (Haddon-Cave, 2009: p217). In sum, contrary to its role of being an 
integrator, IPT, at some points, appeared to be a barrier to coordination.  
The next section provides a cross-case analysis of connecting and steering functions 
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5. Cross-case analysis 
Having presented the key findings across coordination activities for each of the two 
investigated triads, this section compares coordination functions and activities across both 
triads (Table 2).  
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Goal-setting ▪ IPT prioritised its goals (cost and time) over that of RAF 
(airworthiness). 
▪ IPT prioritised its goal of getting the safety case 
approved at the earliest (time) over that of QQ 
(quality). BAE goals were more aligned with IPT in 
this triad, as it needed the case to get their safety case 
approved (rubber-stamped).  
Enforcing  IPT enforced its goals of cost reduction by: 
▪ Reducing procurement’s budget by 20% at the beginning 
of the financial year.  
▪ Promoting and fast-tracking officers delivering on 
efficiency targets 
▪ IPT was able to enforce its goal over QQ by implicitly 
coercing it (the threat of taking the business away) to 
approve the case.  
▪ As QQ wanted to keep IPT happy, it complied. Due to 
IPT’s coercion, BAE Systems was able to get the 
safety case approved without ever submitting it to QQ. 
Constraining action ▪ Repeated questioning and confirming was discouraged by 
IPT 
▪ RAF was not included in the approval processes and key 
decisions 
▪ The whole system of sharing information and getting 
approvals was bypassed, as there was no contract to 
mandate sharing the information with QQ, and both 
IPT and BAE systems wanted to get the case approved 
without any delay.  
Connecting function 
Monitoring ▪ IPT could not monitor BAE Sys ems activity due to 
knowledge-asymmetry. 
▪ IPT hindered QQ’s monitoring of BAE System’s work 
by unethically threatening to go to another safety 
auditor 
▪ QQ was coerced into changing its position and 
approving the safety case without signing it 
▪ QQ complied as it was anxious to not lose business 
Engaging ▪ IPT ignored BAE Systems recommendations regarding 
installation of more safety equipment on the aircraft and 
setting up of a safety case working group (involving all 
three parties). 
▪ There was no evidence of any joint problem-solving, 
engagement or knowledge exchange activities within 
this triad. Instead, in the meetings, QQ’s 
representatives was discouraged to ask clarification 
questions and “booed” at the meetings when they 
voiced concerns with the safety case. 
Liaising ▪ IPT did not liaise between RAF and BAE Systems to 
resolve deviations and did not set up an independent 
safety auditor. 
▪ QQ was made to feel ‘unwelcome’ into the IPT-BAE 
System’s relationship. BAE got away with not 
submitting its work to QQ for review. 
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5.1 Steering function failures of coordination in service triads 
Setting up and enforcing goals is important for ensuring performance (Chun and Rainey, 2005). 
This becomes a complex endeavour in settings involving more than two parties because of the 
presence of multiple buyers and/or service providers. In triad A, IPT was responsible for setting 
up and enforcing goals on behalf of the operational client (i.e., RAF). It was, however, found 
that the goals sought by RAF (airworthiness) were different from that of IPT (cost and time). 
Since IPT occupied the bridge position in the triad, it was able to prioritise its own goals over 
that of the operational client. This was further complicated by the belief that since Nimrod 
aircrafts were operational for over 30 years, they were “safe anyway” and that the safety 
exercise “did not really matter”, a view shared by BAE Systems (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p249). 
The assumption led to the safety case becoming a documentary exercise. “The good track 
record of the Nimrod led to the prevailing ‘high level of confidence’ in the safety of the fleet. 
The view that the Nimrod was ‘safe anyway’ and ‘acceptably safe to operate’ blinded many of 
those involved in the Nimrod Safety Case” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p453). A similar pattern was 
observed in triad-B, where IPT prioritised its goals (cost and time) over QQ’s goal of quality 
assurance. In this case, however, BAE Systems was more aligned with IPT, as both actors 
wanted the safety case to be approved without any delay or hassles. 
In case of triad A, in addition to prioritising their goals over RAF’s goals, IPT enforced 
its metrics of timely delivery and cost reduction for BAE Systems, which were inconsistent 
with the nature of work. The work expected by BAE Systems required far more resources and 
efforts than BAE was ultimately able to assign to this task, owing to increasing pressures to cut 
costs and turn profits in a contract that was designed to prevent them from doing so. BAE 
Systems ended up resorting to opportunistic behaviour to meet these goals. For instance, BAE 
Systems deliberately misled IPT and cut corners in terms of its quality of delivery. It was found 
that BAE Systems “deliberately did not disclose to the Nimrod IPT or QinetiQ the actual 
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percentage figures for the large proportion of hazards which it had left ‘Open’ and 
‘Unclassified’ or otherwise draw attention to the large gap remaining in its analysis” 
(Haddon-Cove, 2009: p284). It also appointed professionals that were inexperienced and not 
capable to deliver the task. These professionals were “insufficiently trained and experienced 
in Safety Cases and the techniques they were required to employ…” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: 
p273). In addition to this, BAE’s work lacked any real analysis and was found to be based on 
inappropriate data. It was also found that in Phase-I, BAE Systems utilised fewer man-hours 
than required, and made 26.1% profit (which was greater than the forecasted 12%).  
In triad B, IPT enforced its goal of getting the report rubber-stamped at the earliest by 
QQ, by threatening to terminate the relationship. QQ, keen to win more business from IPT, 
complied despite its reservations. This enforcement further facilitated BAE Systems’ 
opportunistic behaviour, as it withheld the safety case reports and the hazard logs from QQ. 
These hazard logs which would have enabled QQ to perform an independent safety audit. It 
also gave misleading information to QQ about the scale of hazards identified, ongoing 
progress, and tasks completed. In sum, BAE Systems was not open and transparent in 
presenting its work to IPT and QQ: “BAE Systems gave the misleading impression to the 
Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ that the task had been properly completed and could be signed off 
and deliberately did not disclose to its customer the scale of the hazards it had left ‘Open’ and 
‘Unclassified’ (many with only vague recommendations that ‘further work’ was required). The 
Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ representatives were lulled into a false sense of security. These 
matters raised question marks about the prevailing ethical culture at BAE Systems” (Haddon-
Cove, 2009: p16) 
In sum, IPT, in pursuit of its goals of meeting cost and time targets, lost sight of more 
important goals of airworthiness and quality assurance. Its bridge position also played a part in 
facilitating the enforcement of these goals in triads A and B. Furthermore, opportunism was 
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found to be more pronounced in triad-A, as in order to meet IPT’s goals of reducing cost and 
lead time, BAE Systems produced a safety case that was backed by inappropriate data. In 
conclusion, bounded rationality and opportunism caused steering failures in both triads, albeit 
they were more pronounced in triad A. 
 
5.2 Connecting function failures of coordination in service triads 
In triad A, the monitoring of BAE System’s work was challenged by the knowledge asymmetry 
between the buyer and the service provider. For example, BAE clearly leveraged their 
organisational reputation (cf. Greenwood, 2007) as the design authority in this case and more 
specifically, ensured that the customer felt they were getting a thorough job (“opaque quality”: 
Von Nordenflycht, 2010, p161) by delivering large reports. For instance, during the last two 
months in the lead up the customer acceptance conference at the end of August 2004, BAE 
Systems repeatedly assured the client that their work was on track whilst at the same time a 
series of internal review meetings flagged significant resource concerns, and that very few 
hazards had been “returned” (Haddon-Cove, 2009; please see sections 10A.137, 150, 151, 159, 
161, 166, 176]. Despite these internal concerns, throughout phase 2, the IPT was given 
repeatedly misleading assurances about the progress of the work. Ultimately, it was decided to 
present the IPT with a summary, rather than a detailed review of the baseline reports and the 
contents of the hazard log. Ironically, the appointment of another KIP service supplier as an 
independent advisor to the buyer (leading to the formation of triad B) was intended to help 
overcome some of the worst of these knowledge asymmetries but, by failing to structure and 
engage properly with the governance dynamics of the service triad they were trying to create, 
the IPT never received any meaningful guidance: “This was, on the face of it, a somewhat 
surprising “consensus” for the IPT and QinetiQ representatives to have been party to. […] At 
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this stage, neither the IPT nor QinetiQ had actually seen all of the six NSC reports or 
‘deliverables’.” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p240) 
This knowledge asymmetry was further exacerbated by the appointment of a relatively 
inexperienced manager, Frank Walsh, to monitor the progress of BAE’s work. As found in the 
review, Frank Walsh did not have the qualifications, knowledge, experience or skills to monitor 
BAE’s work. He was not trained in safety management and was not authorised to assess and 
assign risk scores. Furthermore, he had never worked on Nimrod before this assignment and 
therefore had no prior knowledge of the aircraft: “It is not surprising that, most of the time, he 
was clearly out of his depth and did not really know what he was doing” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: 
p327). As Frank Walsh came to realise his errors, instead of alerting his superiors, he tried to 
hide them: “Frank Walsh had realised that these 40 hazards could not simply be left as ‘remote’ 
but had to be ‘managed’ down to “improbable” in order to justify the assertion of ALARP. I 
find that he did this entirely on his own and without the knowledge of either Michael Eagles or 
George Baber. Again, in my judgment, Frank Walsh should have alerted his superiors to this 
matter which he had overlooked. The fact that he did not see fit to do so is, again, regrettable 
and unfortunate.” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p320) Clearly, the appointment of a more qualified, 
knowledgeable, and experienced professional would have reduced some of the monitoring 
problems caused due to knowledge asymmetry.  
In addition to knowledge asymmetry, the monitoring problems in both service triads 
were further exacerbated by dyadic inertia. In triad-A, for example, IPT failed to include RAF 
operators in triad-A, who had the knowledge and technical expertise to evaluate BAE System’s 
work. BAE System also focused more on maintaining its relationship with and satisfying IPT 
over RAF. In triad-B, both IPT and BAE Systems were unable to include QQ in the monitoring 
of BAE Systems work. This was interesting because the whole purpose of BAE System’s 
inclusion in the service triad was to monitor BAE System’s work. IPT saw BAE System as an 
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unnecessary hurdle in the timely completion of work, and BAE Systems withheld information 
from QQ and did not submit the safety case to QQ for inspection. 
Dyadic inertia also created issues for liaising activities. In triad-A, IPT did not work 
with RAF to get early input into the safety case. In fact, a number of RAF operators were not 
aware of the development of a safety case. Similarly, IPT failed to involve a formal and 
independent safety auditor from the beginning and ended up informally appointing QQ as a 
safety auditor at a later stage (triad-B). Due to its lack of formal engagement, QQ was unable 
to evaluate the safety case and potentially enforce the required practices over BAE Systems to 
evaluate its quality of work. It appears that it was a deliberate attempt to keep QQ’s role limited 
in the triad: “The reason why (QQ’s role as the ISA was) not (formalised) is due to a curious 
mixture of oversight, assumption and reluctance: oversight regarding carrying out the 
formalities; the assumption that QinetiQ was already tasked and acting as ISA; and reluctance 
by the Nimrod IPT to allow QinetiQ to become too involved” (Haddon-Cove, 2009: p322). In 
sum, the monitoring of BAE System’s work was constrained by two issues: knowledge 
asymmetry and dyadic inertia. Furthermore, dyadic inertia particularly constrained IPT’s 
liaising activity. 
Unethical practices constrained IPT’s engagement activities in both triads. In triad-A, 
MOD-IPT deliberately ignored RAF’s recommendation to fit an early warning system in all 
Nimrods, which would alert the crew to hot-air leaks. IPT dismissed the prior incident report 
and the recommendation, calling it “unnecessary and impractical”. Moreover, it rejected BAE 
Systems recommendation to install fire suppression equipment in the planes’ bomb bays, which 
were made after reports of fuel leaks aboard the Nimrods. MoD referred to these 
recommendations as “not appropriate” and “unlikely to be effective” (Telegraph, 2007). IPT’s 
intentional rejection of these recommendations reduced the safety of the aircraft. It used its 
position as the bridge of the triad to make unanimous decisions.  
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In triad-B, unethical behaviour was found to much more pronounced in comparison to 
triad-A. In this case, IPT used its authority to coerce QQ to sign off the report despite its 
reservations. IPT treated QQ’s concerns with hostility and subtly threatened them with the 
possibility of being replaced by another auditor: “Martyn Mahy recalls George Baber saying 
‘I don’t need to get independent safety advice from QinetiQ, I can go elsewhere’ […] The 
minutes record George Baber requiring ‘an essential change to the QQ reports’ because 
QinetiQ were ‘not currently offering advice that he felt was needed’ or ‘value for money’” 
(Haddon-Cave, 2009: p216). In sum, it follows that IPT kept its own interests above that of 
each of its stakeholders, and engagement and joint problem solving with its client as well as 
suppliers could have prevented this incident. 
In sum, IPT was unable to monitor BAE systems’ work due to knowledge asymmetry 
between the parties. Furthermore, dyadic inertia, coupled with unethical behaviour on part of 
IPT and BAE Systems, led to the third actors in both triads (RAF and QQ, respectively) not 
being connected to the triad. The practice of unethical behaviour was found to be more 
pronounced in triad-B, as there was no formal agreement between IPT and QQ. IPT, therefore, 
bore no risk in switching suppliers. IPT was able to use this to its advantage and coerce QQ 
into rubber-stamping the safety case despite its concerns. In conclusion, knowledge 
asymmetry, dyadic inertia, and unethical behaviour caused connecting failures in both triads, 
albeit they were more pronounced in triad B. 
 
6. Discussion 
Contracted service triads are steered through three activities: goal-setting, enforcing, and 
constraining-action (Oliveira and Lumineau, 2017). The objective of these activities is to steer 
the service triad towards a common goal. However, in a service triad, all three organisations 
could have different goals (as seen in our cases). Our findings illustrate that bounded rationality 
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of the integrator may lead to prioritisation of its goals over that of the customer. Since, the 
integrator may enjoy the benefits of the bridge position (Li and Choi, 2009; Wynstra et al., 
2015), it may lead to setting-up and enforcement of its own goals over that of the operational 
client. The presence of a structural hole between the service-provider and the operational client 
seemed to encourage the service-provider to prioritise satisfying its immediate customer (i.e., 
the integrator) over the client. This situation might be further supported by the lack of 
information flow from the service-provider as the client may be unaware of this situation. The 
presence of this structural hole may encourage opportunistic behaviour by the service-provider. 
This is because the operational client is not connected to the other actors in the triad to enforce 
its goals, and the integrator is able to enforce its divergent goals in the triad. Faced with this 
conflicting choice, it becomes easier for the service provider to prioritise the goals of the 
enforcer. Also, since integrators are generalist coordinators and not subject matter experts 
(Roehrich et al., 2019), they are often not the best judge of knowledge-intensive work. This 
further creates issues of monitoring knowledge work. In sum, this bounded rationality by the 
integrator and opportunism exhibited by the service provider are manifestations of the ‘dark 
side’ of the phenomenon of tertius gaudens, where the presence of a bridge position and a 
structural hole could be counterproductive for the triad (Li and Choi, 2009; Wynstra et al., 
2015). 
The connecting function of coordination in contracted service triads is performed 
through three activities: monitoring, engaging, and liaising (Oliveira and Lumineau, 2017). In 
the context of knowledge-intensive/ professional services, knowledge asymmetry between the 
integrator and the service provider presents challenges for monitoring work. Without sufficient 
knowledge of the work, monitoring activities such as checking the progress of work and quality 
checks would not reveal non-conformance. This issue could be (potentially) overcome by 
involving the operational client in the monitoring activities. The client, with its prior 
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knowledge of the context of work, could be in a better position to identify any early signs of 
quality issues. Also, the client may be able to provide early and ongoing inputs into the service 
provision. This departs from the traditional conceptualisation of professional services, where 
an ‘expert’ consultant is interacting with a less knowledgeable client. As knowledge 
asymmetry between the client and consultant decreases, the (operational) client plays a more 
active role in diagnosis and problem solving process (Nikolova et al., 2009). The involvement 
of the operational client, however, is dependent on the integrator’s liaising activities. These 
activities could be inhibited by the integrator’s (or the service provider’s) unwillingness  to 
engage the operational client, thus creating dyadic inertia (Kim et al., 2006). Finally, 
engagement activities, involving joint problem solving and development of mutually agreed 
solutions, are one of the most important activities performed by the integrator. These activities, 
however, could be constrained by unethical practices such as deliberate rejection of proposed 
solutions by the service-providers in the interest of achieving short-term goals such as cost 
reductions.  
The role of the connecting function of coordination in service triads becomes 
particularly pronounced in non-contracted service triads (Caldwell et al., 2017). In addition to 
the issues of knowledge asymmetry, an integrator’s unethical use of coercion could further 
inhibit the monitoring of knowledge work. Since the roles and responsibilities of the 
organisations within the service triad are not contractually defined, the integrator could use its 
bridge position to restrict information flow between the other two parties, and exerting undue 
pressure on the actors to comply with the integrator’s demands, thereby compromising task 
quality. This would also send the wrong signal to the opportunistic service provider to withhold 
potentially the required information from the other KIP service supplier (even more so since it 
is not contractually obliged to share information) and deliberately mislead them (both the client 
and other service supplier) about its work quality and progress. In other words, in the absence 
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of formal contracts, the adoption and enforcement of ethical practices by the integrator are 
important for the connecting function of coordination in non-contracted service triads. In sum, 
while steering failures in service triads are linked to bounded rationality and opportunism 
exhibited by actors in service triads, the connecting failures are linked to knowledge 
asymmetry, dyadic inertia, and unethical behaviour (Oliveira and Lumineau, 2019). These 
linkages are illustrated in Figure 5. 
Recent literature has argued that in transitive service triads, where there are no 
structural holes and all actors have direct ties with each other, all three actors have a shared 
responsibility for coordination (Bastl et al., 2012, 2019; Karatzas et al., 2016). In our study, we 
found that in both triads IPT remained the bridge, which not only gave it informational and 
control benefits (Li and Choi, 2009), but also placed the responsibility of coordinating the two 
triads on IPT. As IPT wanted to ensure that its goal of cost reduction was prioritised over goals 
more important to other actors (such as airworthiness and safety), it did not perform the steering 
and connecting functions adequately. IPT also ensured that it retained the bridge position by 
maintaining structural holes in the two triads. 
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Figure 5: Manifestation of coordination failures in service triads 
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7.  Conclusions  
Prior research in service triads has traditionally emphasised the importance of one actor in 
controlling activities, generally the occupant of the bridge position (Li and Choi, 2009). It has 
also emphasised positive outcomes. Our objective in this paper was to examine how steering 
and connecting coordination failures manifest in service triads. The interdependence of 
activities inevitably creates issues in terms of service specification and performance 
attributability, as service contracts are primarily structured on a dyadic level (Bastl et al., 2019; 
Roehrich, Selviaridis, et al., 2020; Selviaridis, 2016; Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014). While 
extant studies on managing service triads have paid most attention to controlling relationships 
(e.g. Li and Choi, 2009; Van der Valk and Van Iwaarden, 2011), our study highlights the impact 
of coordination dysfunction. Furthermore, by examining steering and connecting coordination 
functions (or lack thereof) in contracted and non-contracted arrangements, we reveal a different 
emphasis on coordination activities in each case.  
Our research has important implications for policy and practice. The case shows how 
outsourcing relational governance to system integrators can lead to dysfunction with the 
integrator prioritising its’ goals. Governments will continue to use integrators to deliver 
complex projects but, as the ultimate client, they should still seek to arrange formal and 
informal governance mechanisms with their service providers. For organisations that outsource 
service ‘coordination’ our findings serve as a particularly cautionary tale, they should think 
very carefully before relinquishing the bridge position to a supplier. Moreover, all parties 
involved in triadic arrangements should actively guard against knowledge asymmetry, dyadic 
inertia, and unethical practices.  
Inevitably, our selected research approach and type of data have limitations. However, 
this concern must be set against the richness of the documentary evidence; especially in a 
context where the alternative is no public data/research at all. Further research into successes 
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and failures of different service triads may prove a fruitful future research avenue. Extending 
the range and number of service triads ‘types’ that are studied (e.g., contracted and non-
contracted, different knowledge assets, professions, organisational structures, countries, sizes, 
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